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CHAPTER 11
Formula for Leadership
Abstract This chapter presents Nika Gilauri’s personal perspective on
public leadership. He describes key success factors developed during his
term as a leader in Georgia’s reform government, initially as a cabinet
member (from 2004, as minister of energy) and later as prime minister
(2009–2012): a determined team, a shared vision, and decisive action.
The chapter concludes with an account of crucial wartime leadership
challenges during the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, including
the story of how the author kept the country in cash with the help of a
bottle of Jack Daniel’s.
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The transformation that took place in Georgia between 2004 and 2012
was more comprehensive, more substantial, and more sustainable than
anyone would have hoped, especially in that part of the world. It is
probably one of the ﬁnest examples of economic achievement in a small
developing country in recent years, but the transformation went beyond
economics. Despite many mistakes and setbacks, countries all over the
world look to Georgia for inspiration because the results of lasting change
for the better are clearly visible and widely recognized. The government
that helped bring about this transformation relied on three principles:
team, vision, and action.
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11.1 TEAM
Approach the government in some countries with a question, an issue, or a
proposal, and nine out of ten times you will get the same answer, if you get
an answer at all: “Sorry, not my remit.” In Georgia’s reform government,
it was the exact opposite. No matter who – investors, entrepreneurs,
citizens – came to any one of us, we made their concerns our own,
regardless of whose department was formally responsible. We tackled
every problem as a team, and every minister felt responsible for the
government to succeed as a whole. Elsewhere, ministries are organiza-
tional silos, concerned only with their own performance. As a result, they
often don’t do anything, lest they be blamed when something goes wrong.
And when something actually does go wrong, a minister’s number one
objective is typically to try and shift the blame to someone else. While our
government wasn’t entirely immune to this reﬂex, our creed was that we
are one team, that we take decisions as a team, and that if anything goes
wrong, we deal with it as a team. Internally, the constitutional bodies – the
president, the prime minister, the cabinet, and the members of parliament
– would argue a lot about every topic. But once a decision was made, we
would all speak with one voice and do our best to see it through. There
were two driving forces behind this attitude:
• Collective appointment. The cabinet was approved by the parlia-
ment as a whole, not minister by minister, as it is done in many
other countries. In Georgia, it went as follows. The president was
elected. Parliament was elected. The president presented a candi-
date for the prime minister to parliament, and the candidate pre-
sented a team and a program. Then parliament voted for, or
against, the entire executive team and its program, not for or
against individual ministers. This approach was adhered to even
when there were changes in the cabinet. The prime minister could
only replace up to 30 percent of the cabinet members, and four
crucial ministries were exempt from the prime minister’s discretion
to begin with (interior, justice, defense, and penitentiary institu-
tions). Once the admissible replacements were used up, the prime
minister would have to seek a new mandate from parliament.
Even the performance-based remuneration system was designed
for the cabinet as a whole rather than for its individual members.
Speciﬁcally, 50 percent of a minister’s bonus was based on the
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performance of the country as a whole, as measured by the most
comprehensive indicator, GDP growth.
• Common mindset. The members of the cabinet certainly disagreed
and argued about a lot of political issues. Despite such disagree-
ments, however, we shared a set of common values and attitudes.
We were all in favor of democracy, meritocracy, and reform, inspired
by and open to Western practices. We all felt that this was our one
chance in life to do something for our country and make names for
ourselves as men and women of action. Of course, it helped that we
were all quite young when we were appointed. Nothing was sacred,
and we were not afraid to try something new, or to fail. If we failed,
we would try something else. There was a shared sense that innova-
tion was a good thing, not a risk to be avoided.
Can other countries in need of reform replicate this spirit? I believe that they
can. Many politicians complain that there is a lack of true talent in their
countries, and that they have trouble attracting the best people to serve
in the government or in state agencies. In my experience, the real problem is
that politicians don’t look beyond the usual suspects and hesitate to bring in
newpeople.Of course, there is a limited number of goodmanagers and daring
innovators in any one party, or any one circle of people for that matter. The
bold move that helped transform Georgia was to look for potential new team
members all the time and everywhere. It does take guts, but it’s not rocket
science: ﬁnd the most promising people, whoever they may be, and give them
an opportunity to prove themselves. With this kind of approach, based on trial
and error, you stand amuch higher chance of creating a high-performing team
than by thinking inside the box all the time. Of course, not every outsider will
live up to the expectations, but over time, a new elite of civil servants will
emerge. In Georgia, many heads of agencies and departments, and evenmany
ministers and their deputies, were chosen not because of their afﬁliation with
a party or a speciﬁc caste of people but because they had new ideas, felt
strongly about particular topics, and were not afraid to speak their minds. In
many cases, an appointment was made based on a simple conversation in
which a candidate had impressed a cabinet member or an occasion on which a
candidate had clearly excelled in the public eye. At one point, almost half the
cabinet was not afﬁliated with any party. Even I, when serving as prime
minister, was not a member of any party.
Another important characteristic of Georgia’s reform government was
its willingness to bring smart people into the team. Often, heads of
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organizations, agencies, ministries, or governments are afraid to appoint
people they deem smarter than themselves as their subordinates, fearing
that the new recruits will eventually challenge their authority or even make
them redundant. The Georgian government that was in power from 2004
to 2012 had no such fear. Quite the opposite: ministers competed with
one another to attract the smartest people to their staff, and they took
pride in their teams. Cabinet members celebrated the accomplishments of
their subordinates as if they were their own, an important source of
motivation for junior staff members.
11.2 VISION
Few months after I took ofﬁce as minister of energy in 2004, I asked my
team to put together the calculations for a nationwide 24-hour electricity
supply. I will never forget the puzzled looks on their faces.
“Why bother?”, they asked. “You know as well as we do that Georgia will
not have 24-hour electricity supply in our lifetime.”
This was coming from the top specialists in the ﬁeld, people who had
worked in the energy sector for much longer than I had, and who knew
the Georgian electricity system much better than I did at the time. Within
18 months of this conversation, 24-hour power supply had become a
reality, and in 2007, we were exporting electricity to our neighbors. This
experience taught me to see opportunity where others see nothing but
obstacles. I made it my mission to inspire others to think that anything is
possible, and that a vision can become a reality if the best people pull
together to make it happen.
In 2004, nobody could imagine that Georgia would one day become a
regional tourist hub, let alone one of the world’s top tourist destinations.
When President Saakashvili ﬁrst proposed an investment program to
develop the tourism infrastructure in Batumi, a port on the coast of the
Black Sea, almost everybody was skeptical. Nobody believed that such an
effort could possibly amount to anything. Back then, Georgia was widely
considered unsafe for foreign visitors, a fundamental issue for any budding
travel destination. There were unresolved geopolitical problems in our
relations with Russia. Some territories were (and still are) occupied by
the Russian army. There was also no tourism infrastructure to speak of. We
did not have a single ﬁve-star hotel, and getting to Georgia was difﬁcult
even for those who were determined to try. What is more, Georgia was
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facing ﬁerce competition from top tourist destinations in the region,
countries like Turkey and Greece. These countries have a well-established
reputation among vacationers worldwide, world-class infrastructure,
world-class connectivity, and milder climates affording longer tourism
seasons. It took a grand vision, an enormous effort, and tremendous team-
work to make it happen, but it did happen. As early as 2011, Monocle
magazine proclaimed a “Batumi Boom” and reported that “Georgia’s
second city is in the midst of a frantic transformation from sleepy resort
to major tourist and investment hub.”1 The number of visitors to Georgia
increased from 350,000 in 2004 to ﬁve million in 2012.
Had someone ﬂoated the idea of building a defense industry in Georgia
in the mid-2000s, any expert in the ﬁeld would have taken it for a joke and
laughed out loud. At the time of writing, Georgia is not only producing
equipment for its own defense systems but also exporting defense tech-
nology to other countries.2
The most important vision, however, was not tied to any sector or
industry, be it energy, tourism, or defense. Rather, the big vision was
that all stakeholders in the country – the population, investors, local
businessmen, and civil servants – would rally around and work toward a
common goal: building a better Georgia − a country that is free of
corruption, has a highly efﬁcient government, and acts as a hub in its
region. A country in which poverty is a thing of the past and in which
hard work will earn you a decent living. Mistakes were made along the
way, and the transformation is not yet complete, but this is certainly not
due to a lack of vision.
11.3 ACTION
The reform government was all about action and accountability. We
took decisions as a team and saw them through as individuals who share
the same set of values. The setup of the government and its procedures
were speciﬁcally designed to support this approach. Even if some deci-
sions were effectively made by individual ministers, the ﬁnal and formal
decision was mostly approved by the cabinet as a whole. There was a
special committee for every major topic, comprising the relevant min-
isters, members of parliament, directors of state-owned companies and
agencies, heads of relevant regulators, and experts in the ﬁeld.
Committee sessions were chaired by the prime minister. In-depth dis-
cussions about the development of a particular sector (be it energy,
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telecommunications, road infrastructure, or education) took place in
these committees. Objectives and concrete steps to achieve these objec-
tives were deﬁned there, and the committees drafted decision proposals
for the government. The cabinet convened every week and took deci-
sions collectively by vote. The purpose of this collective voting was to
make sure that every cabinet member was aware of what was going on
and would back the outcome, no matter how complex the process
leading up to the decision might have been. At the same time, one
person, and one person only, was responsible for following up each
decision and overseeing its implementation. Whenever two or more
people were named as the responsible parties, conﬂicts or delays
arose. This is why we combined collective decision making with indi-
vidual responsibility for implementation. It helped us take bold deci-
sions and ensure fast action.
Acting fast is also what helped Georgia cope with crises, and Georgia
faced more crises over the course of a few years than some countries face
throughout their entire history. Over time, crisis management became
second nature to the government. Speciﬁcally, the team-based fast
action approach helped Georgia survive various regional crises, such as
the one in Ajara in 2004,3 the energy crisis in 2006,4 the world eco-
nomic crisis that started in 2007 and hit Georgia in the midst of a
home-grown political turmoil and an outﬂow of foreign capital; poli-
tical crises, such as the blocking of the whole center of Tbilisi by the
opposition in 2010;5 and the biggest crisis of all, the Russian invasion in
August 2008.
11.4 THE RUSSIAN INVASION
In August, 2008, Russian tanks started rolling into the Tskhinvali region.
On August 12, 2008, the Security Council − most members of the govern-
ment and some members of parliament − had gathered in President Mikheil
Saakashvili’s ofﬁce. The Russian army was only about ten kilometers from
Tbilisi and still advancing. None of us had slept in days. We were tired but
full of energy and determination.
We were discussing the next steps. At the time, I was minister of ﬁnance
and ﬁrst deputy prime minister. All major roads, railroads, and points of
entry had already been blocked. By cutting off all supplies, the Russians
might try to get the Georgian population to rise up against their own
elected government.
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“Okay, we need to decide on a few things,” said Prime Minister Lado
Gurgenidze.
“I will reach out to all the investors and all foreigners who have been doing
any kind of business with Georgia,” he announced. As a former banker,
Lado was very good at “selling” the country, even in difﬁcult moments
like this one.
“The president, the minister of foreign affairs, and the Security Council
are in talks with the international media and foreign politicians −
Americans, Europeans, and so on,” he continued, “but we need some-
body in charge of the economy, someone who will take care of the day-to-
day economic affairs of the country, to make sure we get all the necessary
supplies.” There was silence.
“I propose that EasternGeorgia should bemanaged byNikaGilauri,” said the
prime minister. Silence. Nobody agreed, nobody disagreed. I realized that
I had a huge job to do, and that I should have left right away to get started.
But I wanted to hear who my counterpart for Western Georgia would be, so
that we would be able to coordinate our actions. I lingered for a few more
minutes.
“Well, if there are no other candidates, then I guess Nika should be in
charge of supplies for all of Georgia,” Lado said and looked at me. What
was there to say? I nodded, got up, explained that I had a lot to do, and
said my goodbyes. It wasn’t the ﬁrst time that I was given a job nobody
else wanted, simply because nobody could conceive how it was supposed
to be done.
I rushed to my ofﬁce. During the short drive, I thought about the tasks at
hand. I would have to provide food, water, drugs, electricity, gas, petrol,
and cash to a country invaded by 100,000 Russian soldiers and who knows
how many tanks. There were Russian air strikes every day. The Russian
army had taken control of most of the country’s crucial infrastructure,
including the port of Poti and the Georgian railway, and was moving
toward Tbilisi. When I got to my ofﬁce, I asked my team to gather all
economic and social ministers right away. My ofﬁce staff told me later that
this was the ﬁrst time I had a crazy look on my face. It was not surprising –
this was the ﬁrst time I had no clue what to do.
I needed a plan. I needed a team. Instead, I foundmyself surrounded by a
group of ministers who had no idea what to do either. They were all looking
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at me expectantly. This was when I realized that I couldn’t let my own
perplexity show. If they saw me acting lost, or as if I didn’t know what I was
doing, we would fail miserably. I mustered all my strength and convinced
myself that I knew exactly what needed to be done. I started explaining my
action plan. I could hardly believemy ownwords. Aminute earlier, I had had
no idea where even to start, let alone whatmy concrete action plan would be.
“Where danger threatens, salvation also grows,” as Friedrich Hölderlin
put it.6 Within one hour, we had an action plan. Initially, we focused on
food. We had identiﬁed the twelve types of food that were most widely
consumed: bread, cheese, butter, wheat, beef, poultry, milk, and so on.
Monitoring this basket of essential products would alert us to imminent
shortages. We tracked the prices of these products three times a day in
Georgia’s ten largest cities, including the capital and regional centers. In
each city, we picked a handful of shops. We instructed three different
government agencies to monitor the prices of each product type and
send the information to my ofﬁce. The representative of the local govern-
ment was in charge of monitoring the prices in the morning, the depart-
ment of statistics did the same thing in the afternoon, and the revenue
service took over the evening shift. We had purposefully split the job
between three agencies to ensure some measure of checks and balances.
Everybody was nervous during these difﬁcult days. Occasionally, local
governors called us in a panic, claiming that their region was out of food
and demanding that we send them additional supplies. Thanks to our triple
sources, we knew that these claims were usually false. As soon as the price of
one of the products in a particular region went up, we sent additional
supplies of that product to the region. We didn’t, however, give these
supplies away for free but sold them to the local shops to make sure the
regions received only what they really needed. This system helped us avoid
any shortage of essential food products during the war.
Demand management was under control. Our next task was supply
management. Where would we ﬁnd the products we needed, and how
would we get them to the regions? The Russian army had blocked both the
railway and the main East-West highway. This is why we established two
bases, one in Eastern Georgia and one in Western Georgia, each stocking
the twelve essential food products. To stock the bases, we bought products
from wholesalers, rather than from shops. This was to make sure there were
no empty shelves in shops, which might have caused a panic among the
population. In fact, we didn’t even buy everything the wholesalers were
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offering. We left them with enough supplies to keep stocking shops in
Tbilisi and in large cities.
I was relieved that our improvised system of price control was working.
There was no shortage of any of the essential products and nobody
panicked. Nobody even skipped a line in a supermarket, and nobody
broke any trafﬁc rules. The fact that the people of Georgia were so law-
abiding, so supportive of each other, and so calm despite the invasion
made me incredibly proud of my country. Still, that whole period is very
much a blur to me. Our days started at 7 am in the morning and ended at
4 am the next morning. We went through prices, took stock of supplies,
and arranged for deliveries. Based on our intelligence about the move-
ments of the Russian army, we tried to anticipate where our citizens might
take refuge and arranged to have food supplies waiting for them.
When food supplies started to run low at wholesalers’ warehouses, we
started importing food supplies ourselves. We rented a few warehouses
around Tbilisi and near Batumi to store our imports. We bought supplies
for Western Georgia from Turkey and for Eastern Georgia from Azerbaijan.
As it happened, one of my fellow ministers, Alexander “Ale” Khetaguri, the
minister of energy, had been on an ofﬁcial visit in Azerbaijan when the
Russians invaded Georgia. I asked him to stay in Baku to help manage the
imports. Every day, I received a report about the stock of supplies in our
warehouses. Based on this information, we imported additional goods from
Turkey and Azerbaijan.
There were even some cases of wartime heroism behind the lines. Quite
understandably, some drivers had refused to drive trucks loaded with
supplies through territory that was controlled by the Russians. In those
cases, employees of the revenue service got behind the wheel themselves
and drove the vehicles past the posts of the Russian army. In another case,
we had to build a tent city to provide shelter for thousands of internally
displaced persons from the Tskhinvali region. We had the necessary mate-
rials and we had a suitable site, but we had no manpower to put up the
tents. Most members of the army and the police were at the front line.
I called on the members of parliament to help out. In less than an hour,
they were on site, with their friends and families, and rolled up their sleeves.
By the next morning, the tent city was ready. It housed thousands of
internally displaced persons – women and men, children and old people,
newborn babies and pregnant women. Volunteers delivered bread and
sausages several times a day to feed them.
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Thanks to determined leadership, good crisis management, and the
tenacity of the Georgian people, Tbilisi did not fall in 2008. The popula-
tion did not take to the streets to demand the resignation of the elected
government, despite the Russians’ best efforts to starve the capital and stir
up an insurgence.
11.5 TRADING JACK FOR BENJAMIN
In the midst of the invasion, I got a call from the National Bank.
“Nika, we are out of cash.”
“What do you mean, you are out of cash? You are the National Bank. You
have more than enough reserves.”
“No, you don’t understand. We have more than enough reserves, but
these are all in accounts. What we don’t have enough of is actual bills. The
banks are running out of actual bank notes. Everybody is withdrawing US
dollars and euros from ATMs. If we don’t ﬁll up the cash machines, they
will run out in two days. We need to bring in cash from abroad.”
“From where?”
“From Austria. We have already talked to them. Everything is ready. But
how do we get the bills into Georgia?”
“How much are we talking about?”
“Around 350 million US dollars.”
“Okay. I will take care of the logistics.”
I tried to exude conﬁdence, but in reality, I had no idea how to pull it
off. Almost all ﬂights to Georgia had been cancelled. Every plane enter-
ing Georgian airspace would be escorted by a Russian ﬁghter jet. I
pictured a cargo plane full of cash shot down by the Russians, showering
us with Benjamins.7 Putting it all on a single plane was too big a risk. We
would have to hedge our bets. I rang up the Georgia Air Company and
asked them to send a plane to Vienna to pick up USD 100 million to
cover the immediate need. I decided to have the rest ﬂown to Azerbaijan
and brought to Georgia by land, a much safer option. Ideally, we would
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have brought in the entire amount that way, but we needed the ﬁrst
USD 100 million the next day. Going through Azerbaijan would take
much longer. To buy us some time, we announced an ad hoc
bank holiday.
When the plane from Vienna ﬁnally landed at Tbilisi airport, I was
there with an escort of eight special operations soldiers. I hadn’t told
anyone where we were going, or what we were transporting. Driving
around a war zone with USD 100 million in cash is, well, a little risky to
begin with, but telling people about it would have turned the operation
into a downright suicide mission. As it happened, we delivered the
package safely to the vault of the National Bank. I instructed the banks
to re-open earlier than usual the next day to show everyone that there was
no shortage of cash. The main concern was to avoid that lines of people
would snake out of the banks. The banks managed it well. Some banks
even gave cash to their employees and had them deposit it in their
accounts for everyone to see, saying that they had withdrawn it that
morning, that there was no issue with the supply, and that their money
would be safer in their accounts than in their homes. By the end of that
day, people started bringing back cash and depositing it in their accounts.
The crisis was averted. Not one request by international depositor or
investor was delayed for a minute.
I turned my attention to the remaining USD 250 million. I had the
cash ﬂown to Baku, Azerbaijan. Ale, Georgia’s minister of energy, was still
in Baku at the time. I called him on a secure line at the Georgian Embassy
there and briefed him on the situation. I asked him to pick up the cash at
Baku airport and bring it to the Azeri-Georgian border where I would
meet him.
“Ale, listen carefully. When you leave the embassy, you will not have access
to a secure line. So when you call me from your mobile, don’t mention the
money. Let’s call it the guest. When you tell me that the guest has arrived,
I will know that you have the cash. When you tell me that the guest is
feeling well, I will know that you have counted the cash and it is all there.
I may not be able to make it to the border in time because of the trafﬁc.8
In that case, I will tell you to ‘fuck off’, and you will store the cash in a safe
place in Baku. If, however, I tell you to ‘get lost’, you will bring the cash to
the border. Understood?”
“Understood. But ‘fuck off’ and ‘get lost’ sound so similar. We might get
confused. Can’t we use a different code?”
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“I’m not feeling particularly creative right now, and there’s no time. Let’s
stick with these phrases. Let’s write down what they mean.”
“Ok. I will call you in a few hours. But I have one request.”
“What is it?”
At this point, I was prepared for pretty much anything, but Ale’s answer
still took me by surprise.
“You know how much I love Jack Daniel’s.”
“So?”
“I keep a bottle in my ofﬁce. It was a gift from the US ambassador. When
you come to the border, can you please bring me the bottle?”
“I’ll tell you what. You bring me USD 250 million, and I will bring you the
bottle. That’s going to be the most expensive bottle of whiskey in the world.”
We hung up. My phone rang a few hours later. I was on my way to the
border. As I had feared it was almost impossible to get to the Azeri border.
“Nika, our guest has arrived.”
“Is he feeling well?”
“Yes, he is ok. What shall we do?”
“Fuck off.”
“Wait. Fuck off?”
I checked my notes.
“Yes, fuck off.”
There was silence on the line. I realized that Ale, too, was looking at his
notes.
“Ok. We will fuck off.”
After a few hours, trafﬁc had eased. I would ﬁnally be able to get to the
border without further delays. Again, I could not tell anyone where I was
going, or what my mission was. I was accompanied by the same team of
special operations soldiers that had protected the pick-up at the airport.
We were in two armored vehicles. To this day, there are allegations in
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Georgia that these vehicles carried members of the Georgian government
trying to ﬂee to Azerbaijan. But in fact, it was me on my way to trade a
bottle of Jack for a truckload of Benjamins. I called Ale on his mobile.
“Ale, you can get lost now.”
“What? Get lost? Wait, which one is that? So, get lost?”
“Yes, get lost.”
“Okay.”
A little later, I was in the neutral territory between the Georgian and Azeri
borders, surrounded by handful special operations soldiers, holding a
bottle of Jack Daniel’s Tennessee Whiskey in my hand. It was pitch dark.
I couldn’t see a thing. I heard footsteps.
“Ale, is that you?”
“Who do you think?”
“Thank God.”
Ale stepped into the light.
“Where is my whiskey?”
“I’ve got it right here.”
I showed him the bottle and started moving toward him.
“Where is my money?”
“I’ve got it right here.”
An armored truck inched forward into the light.
“Do you want to count it?”
“Have you counted it?”
“I have. It’s all there.”
“Okay. Here’s your whiskey.”
I passed him the bottle of Jack Daniel’s. We said our goodbyes. I headed
back to Tbilisi with USD 250 million in cash, and Ale headed back to Baku
to help arrange for further food supplies to be brought into Georgia.
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A few days later, George W. Bush announced that the United States
would send humanitarian aid to Georgia, and that he had charged the navy
with delivering it (“Operation Assured Delivery”9). On September 8, 2008,
the USS Mount Whitney, the ﬂagship of the 6th U.S. Fleet, arrived in
Georgia, carrying tons of aid and thousands of soldiers. The war was over.
11.6 THE WAR ROOM
A few days later, a high-ranking U.S. general asked me where I had
received my wartime logistics training.
“It was an on-the-job training program. It started on August 8. I can’t say
that I like it, but I’m deﬁnitely learning a lot about crisis management.”
The general smiled and asked whether he could see our war room.
“I was told that you are in charge of the war room, providing food supplies
to the population. If it is not conﬁdential, may I see it?”
“Of course,” I said. I think he expected to see a sophisticated underground
facility, with lots of computer screens and the latest communication tech-
nology. I took him to the war room – my ofﬁce. A few tired-looking
ministers were gathered there. One of them was taking a power nap on my
couch. The strategic equipment consisted of a handful of mobile phones, a
whiteboard ﬁlled with various calculations, and a large wall map of Georgia
with markings that indicated the emplacements of the Russians and destina-
tions for our food deliveries. For a second, the general looked at me with a
frown, as if I was pulling his leg and hiding the true war room from him. But
then he looked at our faces and realized that this was really it.
“May my assistant take a photo of the room?”, he asked.
“Be my guest,” I said.
I wonder whether that photo still exists.
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